

### Which Anthology are these?

We have got to qualify all this; for to the situationist there is one thing and one thing only that is absolutely, always and universally good – *and that one thing is love*.

Are we going to be driven to this conclusion that nothing is absolutely right and that apparently still less is anything absolutely wrong, and that it all depends on the situation? Is it true that goodness and badness are not qualities which are built into actions, but things which happen to an action within a situation, that they are not properties but predicates?

It is as the man Jesus that he is the Messiah, the *Kyrios*, the Son or the Word of God. This is a concealing of his being. Jesus is Lord, not as an earthly lord, but as the man who wills only to be obedient.

Now all *imperatives* command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain something else which one wills (or which it is possible that one might will). The categorical imperative would be that one which represented an action as objectively necessary for itself, without any reference to another end.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced.

The situationist is always confronting us with decisions. There is no absolute right and wrong; we have to work it out in each situation. There are principles, of course, but they can only advise; they do not have the right of veto. Any principle must be abandoned, left, disregarded, if the command to love your neighbour can be better served by so doing.

If A chooses to shoot B then we classify this as an intended act; if C sees A and fails to stop A shooting B then this is an intended omission. The point is whether C is at all blameworthy. In this incident, if C is a pacifist they might well justify their action by appealing to a negative responsibility, i.e. by failing to act they were morally blameless. They might even argue that refraining from acting took a great deal of moral courage. But however one looks at it, C was prepared to condone the death of B and accept whatever the consequences this might entail. Some object to this. Can I be held responsible for failing to help stop the deaths of thousands dying in poverty in the Third World?

The distinctions that have been made in theology between God's and man's being are externally important, but they tell us nothing about the inner relationship between God the Father and God the Son and therefore cannot be applied to the event of the cross which took place between God and God.

The practical imperative will thus be the following: Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means. We will see whether this can be accomplished.

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that supervenes upon acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward.

Innocent minds are corrupted by adults cramming their religious beliefs down their children's throats. Dawkins argues that the biological process of natural selection builds child brains with a tendency to believe whatever their parents or elders tell them. This, he suggests, makes them prone to trust whatever a parent says—like Santa Claus.

There is, I suppose, a lunatic fringe to every movement.

Christians have to speak about God in the presence of Jesus' abandonment by God on the cross, which can provide the only complete justification of their theology. The cross is either the Christian end of all theology or it is the beginning of a specifically Christian theology.

In this narrower sense, Jesus' crucifixion was an act of atoning, or making up for, human sin. On the other hand, in the broader sense in which atonement simply means salvation, or entering into a right relationship with God, Jesus' death may or may not be separated off from his self-giving life as a whole as having a special significance of its own. As a rough approximation we can say that the broader sense has been more at home in the Eastern or Greek development of Christianity and the narrower in its Western or Latin development.

However, today the idea of an actual human fall resulting in a universal inherited depravity and guilt is totally unbelievable for educated Christians. Instead of the human race being descended from a single specially created pair, we see the species as having evolved out of lower forms of life over an immensely long period of time.

Richard Swinburne, in his *Responsibility and Atonement*, has recently made an impressive attempt to retrieve a transactional conception.

Jesus Christ is the Son of God who became man, who as such is One with God the Father, equal to Him in deity, by the Holy Spirit, in whom the Father affirms and love Him and He the Father, in a mutual fellowship.

*Deus pro nobis* did not have to be, but is. How? God took it upon himself to share with Israel its place, status, and situation by making them his own. God has not abandoned the world and man in the unlimited need of his situation, but He willed to bear this need as his own, he took it upon himself, and he cries with man in this need.

Another *indirect* argument has a long tradition in Natural Law ethics and involves two kinds of intention. According to the double effect (DDE) argument there is a difference between foreseeing an event and directly intending or *willing* it to happen.

The death of the Son is different from this "pain of God" the Father, and for this reason it is not possible to speak, as the Theopaschites did, of the "death of God". If we are to understand the story of Jesus' death abandoned by God as an event taking place between the Father and the Son, we must speak in terms of the Trinity and leave the universal concept of God aside, at least to begin with. In Galatians 2:20, the word *paredoken* appears with Christ as the subject "...the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."